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Abstract
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1 Introduction
With almost daily media attention of high profile scandals, corruption, generally defined
as ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’ (OECD 2010), has been recognized as a major
problem. In general, a corrupt transaction is illegal and exerts a large negative external
effect on outsiders, which is usually assumed to be larger than the sum of benefits to the
agents who are directly involved. This defines corruption as socially inefficient (Klitgaard
1988, Rose-Ackerman 1999).
In addition to traditional views of deterring an agent from engaging in criminal activity
by varying the amount of penalties and the probability of detection (Becker 1968), the New
Institutional Economics (NIE) of corruption concentrates on finding an institutional design
that optimally exploits the instability of the corrupt transaction between a client and an
official (Schulze and Frank 2003).
The instability of a single corrupt transaction stems from the enforcement problem be-
tween a bribing agent and a potentially corrupt official. Its illegal nature precludes the
assistance of legal third parties, i.e. the courts (Lambsdorff 2007). The occurrence of corrup-
tion therefore relies heavily on trust and reciprocity and is difficult to explain in standard
theoretical models. Nonetheless, national as well as international organizations such as
Transparency International, the OECD and several national fiscal authorities publish lists
of (institutional) policy recommendations containing measures to curb corruption. Along
with ‘staff rotation’ (analyzed in Abbink 2004), the introduction of the Four-Eyes-Principle
(4EP), ‘a requirement that business has to be effectively conducted by at least two individ-
uals (four eyes)’, is one of the most prominent examples (Pörting and Vahlenkamp 1998,
Rieger 2005, Wiehen 2005, Hussein 2005). As a result of general problematic tractability
(let alone predictability) of corrupt behaviour, a theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of
the 4EP does not exist. Nor is there any kind of traceable empirical evidence to support its
usefulness.
Not only in the corrupt context, but also on a general level, the distinction between
individuals and small groups as decision-makers has been widely ignored in the theoretical
literature. Differences between the behaviour of individuals deciding alone or in a group
have only recently been addressed in the field of experimental economics, where results seem
ambiguous. Some studies find that the behaviour of groups is closer to standard equilibrium
predictions derived from the self interested model of payoff maximization (e.g. Bornstein and
Yaniv 1998, Blinder and Morgan 2005), other studies (e.g. Kocher and Sutter 2005, 2007,
Cason and Mui 1997) provide experimental evidence to the contrary. Kocher and Sutter
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(2007) conclude that the direction of the group decision-making effect critically depends on
the nature of the task determining which of two countervailing motives, the profit maximizing
motive or the competitive motive, dominates. The basic set-up of our laboratory experiment
is close to those used in Abbink (2004) and Lambsdorff and Frank (2010). Our experiment is
designed to assess the effects of the introduction of the 4EP on observed levels of corruption.
Within this framework we model the 4EP as replacing a single official (deciding individually)
with a group1 of two officials deciding jointly according to a decision-making process that
secures veto power for non-corrupt officials.
Using four different treatments we can separate two countervailing effects of the intro-
duction of the 4EP. One is due to the difference in marginal incentives resulting from the
division of the transfer between the jointly deciding officials. The other effect is determined
by the group decision-making process alone (keeping marginal incentives constant). Re-
jecting predictions taken from (self interest based) arguments within the standard model of
corruption, we find that the introduction of the 4EP increases the frequency of successful
corrupt transactions unambiguously. We substantiate this hypothesis in three stages. First,
we consider only outcomes (actual corruption levels). Second, we investigate behaviour in
the decision-making process, i.e. we compare initial and final choices. Third, we analyse the
content of electronic text messages exchanged during the decision-making process between
jointly deciding officials. Our results strongly suggest the dominance of the profit maximizing
motive (Kocher and Sutter 2007, Blinder and Morgan 2005). Groups reveal more functional
behaviour with respect to conditional responding. By their higher (joint) cognitive capacity,
groups of officials seem to be more capable of maximizing their payoffs by following strate-
gies that are shown to lead to a higher frequency of corrupt transactions based on mutual
reciprocity.
Our explanations of the observed effects are in line with the argumentation of the persua-
sive argument theory (Pruitt 1971). Since groups perform better in solving the enforcement
problem between briber and official, the introduction of the 4EP moves behaviour further
away from the theoretical prediction of selfish behaviour, which, in the corrupt context falls
in line with the social optimum. Therefore our results cast doubt on the usefulness of the
introduction of the 4EP and its justification as a recommended measure against corruption.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
set-up giving details on the specifications of all four treatments. Section 3 analyses the
effects of the introduction of the 4EP in the framework of the NIE of corruption and forms
hypotheses. Section 4 gives details on the procedure of the experiment. In Section 5 we
1Although the entity consists of only two participants we call it a group rather than a team.
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describe the main findings, provide a detailed explanation of the empirical strategies and
interpret the results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Experimental set-up
2.1 Corruption and the NIE
In its most general form, a corrupt transaction can be described as a Principal-Agent-
Client relationship, in which the principal, represented by the government or any kind of
benevolent authority, deals with its clients (private entities, e.g. firms) through its agents, the
potentially corrupt (not perfectly monitored) public officials. Clients may have an incentive
to transfer side-payments (i.e. bribes) to relevant officials in order to alter their behaviour
with respect to their duties (i.e. fulfilling legal procedures clearly defined but not perfectly
controlled by the authorities).
The main mechanism of the instable and therefore interesting part of the relationship is
best explained in a simple 3-Stage game:
In Stage 1, a client (e.g. a potentially bribing firm) B decides on the level of bribe b=0,1,...,12
Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) to be given to a potentially corrupt official O. The
limit of 12 EMU reflects B ’s budget constraint. At this point the amount of b is tripled.
The factor 3 captures the idea of a difference in the marginal utilities of money between a
(wealthy) client and a (poor) official (Abbink et al. 2002).
In Stage 2, O can either ‘accept’ the transfer b and keep the tripled amount (3*b) to
herself or ‘reject’ it. In the latter case the game ends, O keeps only b to herself (as some
‘benefit’ from pro social behaviour) while the rest (the remaining amount of 2*b) is used
for the ‘public benefit’.2 If O accepts the bribe, she gets the tripled transfer for sure. She
automatically enters Stage 3 where she decides between two options. The first option includes
initiating an increase of B ’s payoff by 16 EMU (delivering the corrupt service) at the fixed
costs of 4 EMU (to herself). In this case, the ‘public’ suffers substantially (by −24 EMU).
Note that independent of the size of the transfer, the negative externality is always larger
than the sum of payoffs for the agents B and O so that a successful corrupt transaction is
always inefficient by construction.
In the second option O arranges nothing (implicitly defects on B), saving costs for herself
2This implies the assumption of equal marginal utility between O and the public.
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and the public from the negative externality. The costs of delivery may be interpreted as the
certainty equivalent of the lottery: punishment in the case of detection and corrupt success,
or as the practical costs of engaging in a criminal activity, e.g. hiding illegal activities from
colleagues and superiors.3
If O decides against delivering the corrupt service in Stage 3, B does not get the bonus,
O does not bear the costs of 4 EMU, and only a minor negative externality to the public (4
EMU) is realized. Within the standard self interested model it is never optimal, neither in
a one shot nor in a finitely repeated game, for O to deliver the corrupt service and hence
for B to transfer a positive bribe, see Appendix A for a short proof. Figure 1 represents the
basic set-up in its extensive form.
Figure 1: Extensive form representation
2.2 The 4EP
In order to investigate the effects of the introduction of the 4EP on the level of corruption
in this set-up, we consider two participants instead of one making the decisions of the official
3Abbink (2004) uses a fourth stage which accounts for probability of detection. Using a lottery instead of
a fixed amount to model the cost of corruption adds another problem of individual differences (risk aversion).
This would require to disentangle potential treatment effects from differences in risk aversion.
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in Stage 2 and Stage 3. We define the level of corruption as the frequency of successful
corrupt transactions relative to the total number of possible transactions.
We use four different versions of the game as treatments of the experiment. In all four
treatments, subjects play their version of the corruption game for ten successive periods.
After each period they learn about their group partners’/partner’s (payoff relevant) choices.
All treatments are run in a partner design so that all subjects remain in their respective
unit (of B and O subjects) for all ten periods of the experiment.
In our experiment, the ‘public’ is modelled in two different ways. In one set of sessions
(mode 1) we model the externality on the public as payments (reductions of payments) to
four randomly chosen participants of the (same session of the) experiment. In the second
set of sessions (mode 2) we model the externalities as increases or decreases in the amount
of a donation to the public aid organization ‘Doctors without Borders’. The total amount
of added or deducted payments is equal across the two modes.
IDT14
In Treatment 1, the ‘Individual Decision-making Treatment 1’ (IDT1), we consider units of
two subjects, one in the role of the official O and one in the role of the potential briber B.
The 3-Stage corruption game (see Figure 1) is played for ten consecutive periods. At the end
of each period, all participants get to know their own payoffs. Additionally, type B subjects
get information about the (Stage 2 and Stage 3) decisions of their transaction partners (of
type O). While through this information all subjects know about the negative or positive
externalities they have helped to cause to the public (four randomly chosen participants in
mode 1 or ‘Doctors without Borders’ in mode 2) they do not learn about the magnitude of
the spill-overs that may have been caused to them by the decisions of the subjects outside
their unit in mode 1.
TDT1
In the second treatment, the ‘Team Decision-making Treatment 1’ (TDT1), we form units
of three subjects, one B and two O types. The B type decides in Stage 1 about her bribe
b which is tripled and then transferred to both officials of her (3-player-)unit. Note that
although the amount goes to two players, it is subtracted only once from B ’s account. The
parameters of the game are set in such a way that the incentives for the officials are equal
to the ones in IDT1, given the amount of bribe. This way we can separate the true ‘Group
Decision-making Effect’ (GDE) from effects stemming from the partition of the bribe between
the two officials.
4See Figure 6 in Appendix B for the extensive form representation.
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In Stage 2 and Stage 3, the two officials of a unit make their decisions jointly. In both
stages they decide independently first. If they do not come to an unambiguous decision
(e.g. one official decides for ‘reject’, the other for ‘accept’ in Stage 2), they learn about each
other’s choice and decide again. If there is still no agreement, they get the opportunity to
communicate with each other via a real time electronic ‘chat’ in which they can, for one
minute, exchange electronic messages (see the translated instructions in Appendix C).
If there is still no mutual consent, the corruption-unfriendly choice is taken (‘reject’ in
Stage 2 and ‘defect’ in Stage 3). This rule reflects the veto-power of officials who do not
want to support a corrupt transaction.
IDT2
The ‘Individual Decision-making Treatment 2’ (IDT2) differs from IDT1 only in the number
of possible transactions between a particular B -O pair. In this treatment we consider units
of four, two type B and two type O participants. Every type B participant sends only one
transfer to one of the two officials in her unit per period. This means that playing the game
for ten periods makes five possible transactions per pair, producing two transactions per
period and four-player-unit.
TDT2
In the ‘Team Decision-making Treatment 2’ (TDT2) we form again four-player-units. Each
of the two type B players sends one transfer each to the group of two officials who decide
jointly in Stage 2 and Stage 3, according to the same decision-making process explained
for TDT1. Contrary to the case of TDT1, the transfer is split equally so that each of the
officials receives only half of the tripled amount of the transfer chosen by the respective briber
(3 ∗ 0.5 ∗ b). This means that each of the type B participants makes one decision, while each
of the two officials has to decide in two separate situations per period. As a consequence,
each type O subject receives two payoffs per period, while B receives only one.
Here the parameters are set in such a way that one transaction in TDT2 corresponds
to two transactions in IDT2 in terms of payoffs for type O subjects. This means that O ’s
individual incentives in a certain situation (transaction) are not equal to those in IDT1,
TDT1 or IDT2, since a certain transfer b leads to double the amount of revenue reaching a
single official in IDT2 as compared to the revenue reaching each of the subjects in the role
of the official in TDT2. Not only gains (tripled transfers) but also costs (4 EMU) are shared
equally between the two officials.
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2.3 Related literature
The most important difference between the gift exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993) as well
as the investment (trust) game (Berg et al. 1995) and the corruption game is that cooperation
in the form of positive reciprocity is beneficial for all members of society (i.e. the society
as a whole), whereas in the case of corruption, cooperation is only beneficial for the client
and the official but not for the public in general (and those who are hit by the negative
externality in particular). The negative externality is assumed to be high enough to result
in a net social loss. This difference may have strong effects on the level of cooperation and
positive reciprocity, as well as on its behavioural explanations and motivations.
Contrary to theoretical predictions applying the standard self interested model of payoff
maximization, Abbink et al. (2002) find a large amount of cooperation in a series of laboratory
experiments using one-shot as well as (finitely) repeated versions of set-ups comparable to
ours.5
These findings can neither be fully explained (or predicted) by the standard self interested
model (see Appendix A), nor by models of reciprocity based on social preferences (see e.g.
Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002). But even if there was a theoretical
explanation of observed corrupt behaviour there would be a lack of predictive power for the
effect of group decision-making.
We know from the experimental literature on group decision-making that decisions made
in a small group or team can differ substantially from individual decisions even if individ-
ual marginal incentives are equal (Chalos and Pickard 1985, Levine and Moreland 1998).
Experimental evidence suggests that the direction of the effect of group decision-making is
ambiguous and depends highly on the nature of the particular situation. The majority of
studies find that decisions made in small unitary groups (which is the case in our study) act
more in line with the predictions of the self interested model of payoff maximization (Blinder
and Morgan 2005, Bone et al. 1999, Bornstein and Yaniv 1998, Kugler et al. 2007), while
there is also contrary evidence (e.g. Cason and Mui 1997). Kocher and Sutter (2007) show
(using a gift exchange game) that decisions made by a small group may be either more or
less in line with selfish preferences.
5The common feature is the trade-off between reciprocity based maximization of individual long-term
payoffs and a combination of impulses of myopic payoff-maximization and preferences for social efficiency.
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3 Hypotheses
In our analysis, we distinguish between two main effects of the introduction of the 4EP
with respect to the officials’ behaviour. First, the introduction of the 4EP will share a bribe
between two officials instead of going to just one. Keeping B ’s behaviour (i.e. the amount
of transfer) constant, the splitting of the bribe causes each official to receive half of what a
single official would have got. We call the officials’ immediate reaction to the lower benefit
from a bribe in TDT1 and TDT2 the ‘Bribe Splitting Effect’ (BSE). Second, we consider
the pure effect of group decision-making when we hold marginal effects constant and call it
the ‘Group Decision-making Effect’ (GDE).
3.1 Bribe Splitting Effect
From a series of experiments using comparable set-ups (e.g. Abbink 2004), we know that
the probability of success increases with the level of transfer (bribe). For simplicity we assume
that the bribe is shared equally between the two officials, ignoring potential distributional
issues. The existence and magnitude of an effect stemming from the splitting of a bribe
depends on what officials condition their behaviour on. Officials may consider the monetary
benefits of the bribe only or they may include the ‘intentions’ of the briber and their own
moral responsibility.
If subjects condition their behaviour on intentions and equilibrium outcomes alone (i.e.
they consider the ‘kindness’ of B ’s decision only in the sense that it leads to a certain outcome,
given that the transaction is successful) we would not predict any difference between the
conditional behaviour of type O subjects in TDT1 and TDT2. Due to the construction of
the experiment6, strategies leading to equalized outcomes between B and O (ignoring the
negative externalities to the public) are the same across treatments and therefore require
the same actions for both types. Hence outcome-based models of inequity aversion (e.g.
Fehr and Schmidt 1999) would yield the same predictions across treatments assuming the
irrelevance of the negative externality.
Hypothesis 1: “Holding bribe levels constant, there will be no difference in corruption
levels between TDT1 and TDT2, if officials condition their reciprocal behaviour exclusively
on intentions or consider the equalization of payoffs only.”
6Including the difference in the number of transactions played per period by the different types.
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Hypothesis 1 will be rejected if the actual amount of bribe in a particular situation has
an effect on the probability of success of a corrupt transaction (being different in TDT1 as
compared to TDT2). In this case we call the effect the Bribe Splitting Effect (BSE).
3.2 Group Decision-making Effect
In order to measure the effect of group decision-making (GDE) separated from BSE, we
have to compare the behaviour of subjects deciding alone and subjects deciding within a
group in situations in which all relevant decision-makers face the same marginal monetary
incentives. The comparison between IDT1 and TDT1 satisfies this condition. So we compare
the expected number of successful corrupt transactions, E(Nsuccess)IDT1 (one official decides
individually) with the expected number of successful corrupt deals, E(Nsuccess)IDT1 (two
officials decide jointly) facing the same bribe b.
In IDT1, the probability of success of a corrupt transaction is pi(b) for the deal in which
official Oi is relevant. Assume that the probability of corrupt success (reciprocity) is posi-
tively dependent on the relevant bribe b (see e.g. Abbink 2004).
In TDT1, officials Oi and Oj decide jointly in Stage 2 and Stage 3. The group decision-
making process provides veto power for non-corrupt and non-reciprocal behaviour (‘reject’
in Stage 2 and ‘defect’ in Stage 3).
In this case the probability of success is pi(b)pj(b) (both officials have to decide in favour
of corruption), if decisions are completely independent. Since pi(b1) ≤ 1 and pj(b2) ≤ 1,
E(Nsuccess)IDT1 = pi(b) ≥ pi(b)pj(b) = E(Nsuccess)TDT1. As long as the individual behaviour
of officials is independent of the decision-making process (including the observation of or
the belief on the behaviour of the other official), the expected number of successful corrupt
transactions should be weakly greater under IDT1 than under TDT1.
Hypothesis 2: “If decisions are completely independent of the decision-making process
we will observe lower (relative) numbers of successful corrupt transactions in TDT1 than in
IDT1.”
Experimental evidence shows that individual decisions are far from independent when
made inside a group or team. The decisions made by small groups tend to be more in line
with the predictions of the self interested model of payoff maximization when considering
bargaining situations in which competition plays a relevant role, while in games representing
social dilemmas, e.g. the public goods or the gift exchange game, groups may even move
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further away from the predictions of standard game theory (Cason and Mui 1997, Levine
and Moreland 1998). Kocher and Sutter (2007) track this back to two opposing motivations
driving the effect of group decision making, the competitive and the profit maximizing
motive. The total effect depends on which of these dominates.
The set-up of a corrupt transaction cannot easily be categorized into one of the two
situations. Where reciprocity-based cooperation increases the level of social welfare in most
applications (as it usually helps to overcome a social dilemma), corrupt reciprocity decreases
social welfare (and efficiency) by design. For the official it is always individually (in the
short term) as well as socially optimal not to reciprocate in the corruption game.
Competitive Motive
The pure fact of group membership may cause a shift in individual preferences towards
a decision that reflects higher awareness of competition with other groups or individuals
(minimal group paradigm, Tajfel and Turner 1986). In our situation this may push groups
to behave more in line with the predictions of standard game theory. Members of a group
may follow strategies that increase the difference of pay-off levels between in- and out-group
members. Especially under mode 1 (fellow subjects are hit by the negative external effect),
this may help cooperation within and hinder cooperation across groups7.
What distinguishes the individual from the group decision-making treatments in our
experiment is the additional in-group-effect between jointly deciding officials in TDT1 and
TDT2. The creation of a sub-group by letting officials decide jointly may result in more
competitive behaviour towards their type-B transaction (unit) partners, which may result
in myopic profit maximization at the cost of corrupt reciprocity. We denote this motivation
as the Competitive Motive (CM).
Profit Maximizing Motive
The Profit Maximizing Motive (PMM) causes groups to make decisions that yield larger
payoffs (in the long run) while, if necessary, shifting behaviour even further away from equi-
libria predicted by standard theory (Kocher and Sutter 2007). Despite being inefficient on
a social level, a successful corrupt transaction yields the largest individual payoffs for the
transaction partners (unit), given the behaviour of other groups. Groups may be more capa-
ble of suppressing short-sighted impulses of behaviour which may maximize myopic payoffs
but ultimately decreases total individual payoffs of all transaction partners. This behaviour
7This may involve the understanding of participants being involved in a reverse public goods dilemma.
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includes free-riding or defecting in social dilemmas (e.g. the public goods game using the vol-
untary contribution mechanism) and failing to foresee the breakdown of future cooperation
(reciprocal relationships). The Persuasive Argument Theory (PAT, see Pruitt 1971, Bishop
and Myers 1974, Burnstein et al. 1973) predicts that groups are more successful in finding
strategies that maximize their members’ long term payoffs. Explorative and knowledge ca-
pacities in groups are expected to be greater than those of a single individual. Chalos and
Pickard (1985) proclaim that groups are better in processing information load. In games
where payoff maximizing strategies are as complicated as in the repeated corruption game,
we expect groups to develop and follow more successful strategies than individuals with
respect to maximizing their members’ monetary payoffs when we assume that groups and
individuals exhibit equal preferences with respect to the trade-off between individual and
social welfare maximization.
Hypothesis 3: “If the group decision-making process is dominated by the CM, outcomes
in TDT1 will be closer to the game theoretical predictions than those in IDT1. If the PMM
dominates group decision-making, groups will produce higher levels of corruption by following
strategies that are more successful in maximizing their members’ individual payoffs.”
3.3 B ’s behaviour
The introduction of the 4EP may not only affect the behaviour of the officials but also that
of the bribers. The direction of the effect depends entirely on the beliefs about the (effects
on the) behaviour of the official(s). Relying on the assumptions of standard game theory
(within the self interested model), we do not expect bribers across treatments to adhere to
different beliefs about the behaviour of groups and individuals, since in all treatments the
Sub game-perfect Nash Equilibrium (see Appendix A) is unique and predicts neither positive
transfer levels nor positive reciprocation.
While predictions on B ’s expected reaction on the anticipation of the GDE are difficult,
we can form hypotheses on the direction of the effect stemming from B ’s anticipation of the
BSE. This can be quantified by comparing average bribe levels between TDT1 and TDT2. If
bribers anticipate the BSE (correctly) they may send larger transfers in order to compensate
the splitting of the bribe.8
Hypothesis 4: “The bribe level (and distribution) will be different in TDT1 and TDT2
if type B subjects anticipate officials to behave according to the BSE and react accordingly.”
8Note that such a reaction can not be explained by models of inequity aversion, since a strategy that
aims at equalizing payoffs would not proclaim different levels of transfers across these treatments.
12
3.4 Total effect
In order to evaluate the usefulness of the implementation of the 4EP, we consider the
total effect, i.e. the combination of the BSE and the GDE. The total effect can be directly
measured by the comparison of IDT1 (or IDT2) and TDT2. The introduction of the 4EP
can only help to reduce the level of corrupt activity, if the conditions of either of the two
following situations hold. First, the 4EP will certainly reduce corruption, if the BSE and the
GDE are both positive. Second, it will reduce corruption, if a positive BSE over-compensates
a negative GDE (which is dominated by the Profit Maximizing Motive). The introduction of
the 4EP is counter-productive even without considering the costs of the installation of such
an institution if the GDE is negative and over-compensates the BSE.
Hypothesis 5: “If the GDE is negative (PMM is stronger than CM) and dominates the
BSE, the average rate of corrupt success will be greater in TDT2 than in either IDT1 or
IDT2. In this case the 4EP is counter-productive.”
4 Procedure
All 8 sessions (two sessions for each treatment) were programmed and conducted at the
experimental laboratory MELESSA at the University of Munich. It used the program Z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner 2004). Each session was
conducted with 24 subjects (a total of 192 participants). Subjects were randomly assigned
a type, (B or O) and randomly allocated into units of two in IDT1, into units of three
(one type B and two type O participants) in TDT1 and into units of four (two type B
and two type O participants each) in IDT2 and TDT2. In all treatments group members
stayed together in their units for all 10 periods (partner design) where full anonymity
was ensured.9 Every period was paid where 1 EMU was worth 5 eurocents. Payoffs were
summed up over all 10 periods and paid out in private at the end of the experiment. The
whole experiment took less than 90 minutes. The instructions were kept completely neutral,
avoiding any language indicating the subject of research in order to concentrate on the
specific features of the model and minimize the differences between the instructions of the
treatments. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) show that framing has no significant effect
on behaviour in the corruption game. All this was common knowledge to all participants.
Understanding of the (rather complicated) set-up was insured by partly reading out the
9Note that the interaction of officials was conducted via a chat which did not allow for any form of
identification, see the Appendix C for the full instructions of TDT2.
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instructions, answering questions in private and checking of several control questions. At the
end of the experiment subjects filled in a questionnaire including demographic information.
Payoffs lay between 4 Euros and 25 Euros excluding a show up fee of 4 Euros which is
standard to experiments at MELESSA. Average earnings amounted to 14.37 Euros. A
total of 249.10 Euros was paid out as a donation to the organization ‘Doctors without Bor-
ders’ as a result of the decisions made by the participants in the treatments where we chose
mode 2 as a model of the negative externality (one session in IDT2 and one session in TDT2).
5 Results and Interpretation
The negative external effect has been modelled in two different ways. According to
predictions using the standard self interested model, there should be no effect of either of
the two models and hence no difference between the set-ups. The interaction via (unknown
externalities) between groups may however produce an unwanted additional in-group effect
and destroy the idea of the external effect as an unreciprocated reduction in the payoff
of unrelated third parties. Corrupt behaviour might be considered as a payoff equalizing
equilibrium (‘super-game’). In order to rule out effects stemming from these considerations
we applied mode 2 in one session of IDT2 and one session of TDT2. In mode 2, the ‘super-
game’ problem is eliminated by modelling the negative externality as a reduction of a (fixed)
amount of donation to the public aid organization ‘Doctors without Borders’.
Applying (pair-wise) two-sided Mann Whitney U-tests10 we compare all relevant vari-
ables, i.e. the average total transfer-level, the transfer levels after success and failure of a
corrupt deal (measure of the client’s reciprocity), the average relative number of successful
deals, the percentage of rejected bribes and the percentage of zero-value transfers between
observations of the two modes and find no significant difference (p ≥ 0.363; N ≥ 16). We
therefore pool the data from these sessions in the respective treatments for the entire analy-
sis. The absence of a ‘super-game’ effect may be explained by subjects having difficulties in
forming beliefs of higher orders (see Anderson and Holt 1997, Hung and Plott 2001).
10Unless stated otherwise (exact, highest or lowest)p−values and numbers of observations (N) apply to
the two-sided Mann Whitney U-test.
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5.1 Descriptive results
Table 1: Performance variables
Corrupt success Payoff Neg. Externality Transfer level
Treatment mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
IDT1 0.25 0.09 13.13 3.92 2.90 1.01 3.18 1.52
IDT2 0.25 0.06 12.72 3.78 3.49 2.12 3.16 1.25
TDT1 0.47 0.07 7.32 4.26 5.13 2.91 3.58 1.15
TDT2 0.42 0.05 9.40 4.05 5.38 1.97 4.15 1.24
All means are calculated as averages across periods and (relevant) participants of the respective
treatment.
Table 1 shows the values of the four main performance variables in all treatments.
Corrupt success depicts the average share of successful transactions per unit (Nsuccess
Ntotal
).11
Payoff represents the average payoff level (in Euros) after the reduction of the negative
externality12 (final payoff) per subject. Neg. Externality describes the level of the (relevant)
negative externality in Euros. Transfer level measures the average amount of bribe (in
EMU) transferred by type B participants per period and unit.
5.1.1 Corruption levels, payoff and externalities
Comparing corrupt success rates (Corrupt success) between treatments, we can identify
a relatively small but significant Bribe Splitting Effect. The difference in corrupt success
rates between TDT1 and TDT2 (0.05) is significant (p = 0.082; N = 28). We reject
Hypothesis 1. Corrupt success does not seem to depend exclusively on intentions or final
outcomes. Moreover we find a substantial Group Decision-making Effect (Hypothesis 2).
The negative difference in the corrupt success-levels between IDT1 and TDT1 amounts to
0.22 (p = 0.034; N = 40) and strongly suggests the dominance of the Profit Maximizing
Motive (Hypothesis 3). The large and significant difference (0.17) between IDT1/IDT2
and TDT2 (IDT1 vs. TDT2: p = 0.002; N=36, IDT2 vs. TDT2: p = 0.042; N=24) indicates
a negative total effect of the introduction of the 4EP even if we control for the difference in
11Note that units contain two, three or four individuals, which makes a comparison between absolute
levels of corrupt success inconclusive.
12To be able to accurately compare payoff levels between all treatments, we subtract the relevant share
of the reduction of the donation from the actual payoff in the externality mode 2.
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the number of repetitions (between IDT1 and TDT2) confirming Hypothesis 513.
The average net payoff14 is more meaningful in terms of a welfare comparison between
the treatments than the level of corruption. Figure 3 shows the average total payoff level
(Payoff ) per subject in comparison to the average negative external effects (caused by the
average subject, Externality) for all four treatments.
Figure 2: Payoff levels and levels of externalities
The differences in the individual profitability from engaging in corrupt activities between
the treatments are not as large for the officials. We estimate a simple OLS regression,
measuring the marginal effect of N , the number of successful corrupt transactions (number
of choices in which the (group of) official(s) has cooperated) on ‘Payoff’, the total payoff of
each (group of) official(s).15
M2 : Payoffi = β0 + β1Ni + γDi + δDi ∗Ni + i (1)
Vectors D and D ∗ N have analoguous interpretations as D and D ∗ b in Model M1. The
results of the regression are reported in Table 9 of Appendix 2B. Using OLS as well as
Tobit (as a robustness check), we find a strong positive effect of the number of successful
transactions on the total payoff in all treatments. The profitability of being corrupt is
13The Profit Maximizing effect dominates the Competetive Motive in group decision-making. The result-
ing effect is stronger than the Bribe Splitting Effect.
14As net payoff we define the sum of payoffs after subtraction of the externality caused by others’ decisions.
15Since officials within a unit in the GD treatments decide jointly they receive the same payoff and are
therefore treated as a single observation. Officials who are in the same unit but decide independently (IDT2)
are treated as individual observations but we cluster their standard errors in the regression.
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significantly higher in both GD treatments than in the ID treatments (t-tests for IDT1 vs.
TDT1/TDT2 and F-tests for IDT2 vs. TDT1/TDT2; p ≤ 0.004). While officials in the
ID treatments earn on average only 15.892 (IDT1) and 15,075 (IDT2) EMU more for an
additional successful corrupt transaction, the rate is at 19,035 (TDT1) and 20.923 (TDT2)
EMU considerably higher in the GD treatments (Differences between ID and TD treatments
are all significant; t-test for IDT1 vs. TDT1/TDT2, F-test for IDT2 vs. TDT1/TDT2:
p ≤ 0.001).
5.1.2 Transfer levels
Average bribe levels (including 0-transfers) are substantially (and significantly, U-tests
in all treatments: p < 0.001, N ≥ 12) larger than 0 for all treatments and almost identical
within the ID treatments (3.18 and 3.16 EMU). Transfers are at 3.58 only insignificantly
larger in TDT1 than in the individual decision-making treatments (TDT1 vs. IDT1/IDT2:
p = 0.351/0.464, N = 36/28). At 4.15 EMU, the average transfer level in TDT2 is signifi-
cantly (U-tests: TDT2 vs. TDT1/IDT1/IDT2; p ≤ 0.041; N ≥ 24) larger than those in any
of the other treatments. The large difference in transfer levels between TDT1 and TDT2 sug-
gests that bribers anticipate different behaviour from officials and react accordingly. Taking
into account that success levels in corruption are significantly lower in TDT2 than in TDT1
despite the positive difference in transfer levels, we conclude, assuming realistic beliefs, that
bribers anticipate the BSE and ‘react’ by trying to ‘convince’ officials by transferring larger
bribes (Hypothesis 4).
The distribution of the size of transfers reveals even more information about B ’s be-
haviour. Figure 3 shows the relative frequency of transfer levels for all treatments. Transfers
are almost identically distributed in IDT1, TDT1 and IDT2. There are only few low (b < 4
EMU) and high (b > 8 EMU) transfers. We observe a very strong mode at b = 5. This
particular observation may, e.g. be explained by subjects behaving according to preferences
based on inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). The strategy [b = 5 EMU; ‘accept’;
‘cooperate’] leads to equal payoffs for B and O within a unit in all four treatments.16
The distribution in TDT2 depicts a significantly different pattern. We compare the
distribution of bribes in TDT2 to those in all three other treatments with a Kolmogorov-
16For the results to be explained by social preferences we either need to assume that B and O ’s reference
group excludes the public (other participants in mode 1 or recipients of donations from ‘Doctors without
Borders’ in mode 2), or assume a certain structure of beliefs on the (corrupt) behaviour of the other units
(only valid for mode 1).
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Figure 3: Relative distribution of transfer levels
Smirnov test (p < 0.001; observations of strictly positive bribes: N ≥ 382; all observations:
N = 480). In TDT2 probability mass is shifted towards the higher end of transfer levels.
The second mode at b = 10 EMU can be explained by a reaction to the bribe splitting.
Within a certain situation between a particular briber and two officials, the strategy [‘b = 10
EMU’; ‘accept’; ‘cooperate’] leads to equalized payoffs. However, since the total payoff for
a certain period consists of two payments for each of the officials, while the briber only
receives one, this strategy does not equalize outcomes with respect to the total period payoff.
It is common knowledge (and was made explicitly clear with the help of several control
questions in the instructions) that it is the strategy [‘b = 5 EMU’; ‘accept’; ‘cooperate’]
that yields equal outcomes (in expectations) for all transaction partners, just as in the other
treatments. While the monetary benefits as well as the monetary costs are split in TDT2
(compared to TDT1) we may interpret the higher levels of transfer levels in TDT2 as a
premium compensation for the ‘moral’ costs of causing damage to the public, which applies
to both participants, since they both have full (moral) responsibility for the corrupt outcome.
5.2 Conditional reciprocity
Throughout the experimental literature on trust and reciprocity in general (Fehr et al.
1993) and on the corruption game in particular (see e.g. Abbink et al. 2002, Abbink 2004,
Lambsdorff and Frank 2010), the scale of reciprocation has been found to depend critically
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on the first mover’s behaviour (in our case the level of b). In order to explain differences in
the level of corruption between our treatments we need to control for the level of transfer.
Figure 4 shows the probability of a successful corrupt deal (in %) for any positive bribe level
(1-12 EMU) for all treatments.
Figure 4: Success rates conditional on Transfer
In all treatments success rates increase with the level of b (Spearman rank correlation
coefficients ρ ≥ 0.85; p < 0.001 for all treatments). This is not surprising, since the cost
of corruption is fixed, and future gains from successful reciprocity increase with the size of
the bribe, assuming that bribe levels are positively correlated across periods. While the
relationship between success and transfer levels seems almost linear in IDT1 and IDT2,
we observe a different pattern for the GD treatments. In these treatments the conditional
probability is substantially higher for large transfers (b > 5 EMU) and slightly lower for
small ones (b < 5 EMU). We find significant positive differences in probabilities between GD
and ID treatments for larger transfer levels 5 < b ≤ 11, considering transfer levels separately
(TDT1 vs. IDT1/IDT2: p ≤ 0.021, TDT2 vs. IDT1/IDT2: p ≤ 0.094; N ≥ 12). The
negative differences for b < 5 are not significant for pair-wise comparisons except for b = 2
(IDT1/IDT2 vs. TDT1/TDT2: p ≤ 0.08; N = 22). Differences at b = {0; 1; 3; 4; 5; 12} are
not significant at any relevant level between ID and TD treatments (p ≥ 0.127; N ≥ 5).
Parametrically, the most straight-forward way to quantify the differences in the proba-
bility of a successful corrupt transaction conditional on the relevant transfer between the
treatments is to use a linear panel regression (random effects) controlling for clustered stan-
dard errors on the unit level. Since we are primarily interested in the causal relationship
between the level of transfer (b) and the success levels (SC ), we do not distinguish between
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a corrupt deal that failed in Stage 2 or in Stage 3. Treating the decisions ‘reject’ and ‘defect’
equally with respect to the outcome of a corrupt deal (success or failure), we do not have to
take the selection process of reaching Stage 3 into account.17
We use the following specifications for the linear probability model:
M3 : Prob(SCit = 1|ψX) = β0 + β1bit + γDi + δDi ∗ bit + θZi + it (2)
ψ stands for the vector of coefficients. X represents independent variables. Again, vectors D
and D∗b stand for treatment dummies and interaction terms of treatment dummies with the
transfer b, just as in Model M1. Vector Z contains individual demographic characteristics
(e.g. age, gender18, an interaction term between gender and the level of transfer, etc.) ob-
tained from the questionnaire. Since we do not find any significant effects with any of these
characteristics we do not report them in the regression output (Table 3).19 M3 in Table 2
reports the results (coefficients and standard errors) of the linear probability model.
In all treatments, we find that an additional unit in transfer (b) increases the probability
of the corrupt success significantly (1%-level). The effect is significantly stronger in both
GD than in the ID treatments ( t-tests for IDT1 vs. TDT1/TDT2: p ≤ 0.003, F-tests for
IDT2 vs. TDT1/TDT2: p < 0.001).
17Treating the outcomes of ‘reject’ and ‘defect’ differently would require a Heckman-selection process
explaining the selection of cases in which Stage 3 is reached (Heckman 1979).
18For officials in the GD treatments we use a dummy for ‘all-female’ groups and do not distinguish between
‘all-male’ and mixed groups.
19As a robustness check we ran the panel regression with a series of specifications, including a regression
excluding Z and a set of pooled OLS regressions including dummy variables for periods. None of these
specifications yield results qualitatively different from those reported in the left part of Table 2.
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Table 2: Output of (M3) and (M4)
Dependent variable: SC
(M3) (M4)
Lin. Prob Probit
Coefficient Stand. error Coefficient Stand. error
Constant 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0215 1.5832∗∗∗ 0.1052
DIDT2 0.0981
∗∗∗ 0.0351 0.5442∗∗∗ 0.1536
DTDT1 −0.0343∗∗ 0.016 −0.4637∗∗ 0.2091
DTDT2 −0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0232 −1.3272∗∗∗ 0.3162
b 0.0593∗∗∗ 0.0132 0.2123∗∗∗ 0.0171
DIDT2*b −0.0208 0.0175 −0.0981 0.0872
DTDT1*b 0.0521∗∗∗ 0.0162 0.2438∗∗∗ 0.0402
DTDT2*b 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.0133 0.3402∗∗∗ 0.0540
Pseudo R2 = 0.36 −
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level.
Number of subjects: 96, Number of clusters: 64, Number of periods: 10
The non-linear relationship of success-probabilities and transfer levels observed in Figure
4 can be quantified by a simple maximum likelihood model. To account for differences in
the marginal effect of an additional unit in transfer on the success probability across transfer
levels we run the following Probit model in its panel version (random effects).20 We use the
same set of independent variables and repeat all robustness checks (pooled version etc. )
applied to the linear probability model (M3).
M4 : Prob(SCit = 1|ψX) = φ(β0 + β1bit + γDi + δDi ∗ bit + θZi) (3)
Again, ψ stands for the vector of coefficients and X for independent variables. As expected,
qualitative results (direction and significance of the evaluated marginal effects at the mean
of of transfers b = 3.46) do not change compared to the results from the linear probability
model, see (M4) in Table 2. Table 8 in Appendix B reports marginal effects of the relevant21
variables as well as predicted conditional probabilities of success of model M4. The Probit
model shows that marginal effects are lower in the TD than in the ID treatments for low
20See Pereira et al. (2006) and Gneezy and List (2006) for examples of the use of a panel version of
maximum likelihood models in comparable settings, i.e. repeated gift exchange games.
21Again we do not report any coefficients that are not significant, e.g. a dummy variable for gender.
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transfers, b < 3, while they are higher for b ≥ 4. Consequently, the predicted success levels
(probabilities) conditional on the transfer level are lower in the TD treatments than in the
ID treatments for b ≤ 4 while they are larger for b ≥ 6 (see Table 8 in Appendix B).
The pattern shown in Figure 6 and quantified in M4, i.e. a stronger curvature of the prob-
abilistic cumulative distribution function for GD than for ID treatments, may be explained
by differences in the strategies between groups and individuals. On the one hand, groups
of officials seem to ‘defect’ (or ‘reject’) more often in the case of low transfer levels. On
the other hand, they seem to be more likely to reward high transfers than their individual
counterparts by corrupt reciprocity. We interpret this as strategic signals of unwillingness to
return the corrupt favour in less profitable transactions (aiming at inducing a higher transfer
in the following periods) and signals of willingness to reciprocate for high transfers (aiming at
receiving further high transfer in future periods in exchange for cooperation). This strategy
seems to aim at the extraction of a maximum amount of cumulative bribes. In all treat-
ments, a large fraction of non-zero transfers over all ten periods (between 36% in IDT1 and
52% in TDT2) fall into the interval for which the probability of success is significantly larger
in the GD than in the ID treatments. Hence the strategies followed by groups seem to be
more successful in the sense of higher reciprocal stability between briber and official than
the strategies applied by individuals. We interpret this as a piece of strong evidence for the
dominance of the Profit Maximizing Motive in group decision-making (Hypothesis 3).
5.3 Switching behaviour
So far we have analyzed revealed behaviour by considering outcomes alone. Our data
on the group decision-making process allows for a more detailed analysis of the reasons
and motivations underlying observed treatment differences. Since there are no significant
differences in the behaviour of officials between the treatments in Stage 2 (see Section 5.1)
we concentrate on O ’s Stage 3 behaviour.
The data on initial choices of individual officials in the GD treatments demonstrate that (at
least part of) the higher levels of reciprocity within groups are due to mechanisms within
the decision-making process and not based on differences in individual preferences. First,
we identify situations in which officials within a group initially revealed opposing opinions
on a decision, i.e. one official in the group chose to ‘defect’ and the other to ‘cooperate’ in
the first step of the decision-making process. Second, we compare the (relative) numbers of
successful corrupt transactions and failures following initial disagreement. For simplicity we
pool cases of final disagreement and final consent against reciprocation (since both cases lead
to a failed deal because of the veto power rule). Tables 3 and 4 show average percentages of
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corrupt success and failure conditional on initial consent (or the lack of it).
Table 3: Success and Initial Consent, TDT1
Successful corruption Failed Corruption Total
No initial Consent 23.13% 8.75% 31.88%
Initial Consent 23.75% 44.37% 68.12%
Total 46.88% 53.12% 100%
Averages are derived from 160 transactions (16 independent groups of officials in 10
periods) in TDT1
Table 4: Success and Initial Consent, TDT2
Successful corruption Failed Corruption Total
No initial Consent 20.42% 18.33% 38.75%
Initial Consent 21.66% 39.59% 61.25%
Total 42.08% 57.92% 100%
Averages are derived from 240 transactions (12 independent groups of officials in 10
periods) in TDT2
Assuming independence of decisions (i.e. no influence of the process on final decisions) we
would expect 100% of transactions without initial consent to fail because of the veto power
of the non-reciprocating official. On the contrary, we find that the final decision was made in
favour of (corruption-stabilizing) reciprocity in 72.6% (23.13
31.88
, TDT1 in Table 3) and 52.70%
(20.42
38.75
, TDT2 in Table 4) of cases in which the two officials initially disagreed. Assuming that
initial decisions reflect the true underlying preferences, this means that the decision-making
process alone is responsible for a large share of the treatment effects with respect to corrupt
success levels. We conclude that (in both treatments) those officials who are in favour of
engaging in, or maintaining, a successful corrupt relationship dominate the outcome of the
decision-making process although their decision-adversaries hold veto power. We take this
finding as evidence for the Persuasive Argument Theory (Pruitt 1971) which suggests that
those participants (in the role of O) who provide the most valuable ideas for maximizing
long term individual payoffs during the experiment (which in our case is the maintenance of
the corrupt relationship through reciprocity, see Section 5.2) dominate the decisions within
a group.
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5.4 Content analysis
In addition to the arguments derived from the comparison of outcomes between the
treatments (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2) and the analysis of choices in the different phases
of the group decision-making process (see Section 5.3), we are able to get some insight
into the mechanism of group decision-making by considering the content of the messages22
exchanged during the decision-making processes of Stage 2 and Stage 3. 22 (out of 28,
16 in TDT1 and 12 in TDT2) groups exchanged electronic messages.23 First, we separate
messages and identify 132 distinct statements.24 We allocate each statement (sent in either
of the two stages) into four main categories: ‘Neutral’ (statements that do not contain
any traceable argument, e.g. ‘Hello, nice game’); ‘Social’ (statements including arguments
against the cooperation in the corrupt transaction mentioning the negative externality,
e.g. ‘We have to consider the effect on the others, we should not cooperate’); ‘Strategic’
(arguments in favour of the stabilization of the reciprocal relationship with the objective
of payoff maximization, e.g. ‘Let us cooperate, otherwise we won’t get any profit in the
next period(s)’) and ‘Strategic Neg.’ (arguments against cooperation in a certain period
to implicitly demand larger transfers in future periods, e.g. ‘Do not re-transfer, then he
[the briber] will know to give more next time’).25 We add a 5th category ‘Social/Strategic’
to account for (mostly twisted) statements that included both, other-regarding (social)
and strategic (payoff maximizing) arguments. Table 7 reports the relative frequencies of
statements of the respective categories subdivided by the final outcome of the respective
transaction in terms of success and failure. Of all statements, only 12.2%26 contain other-
regarding arguments (Social and Social/Strategic). Their low frequency is noteworthy, and
so is their lack of effectiveness (only 37.7%27) of transactions finally fail).
22We analyse all electronic chat messages exchanged by officials in the GD treatments.
236 groups either did not encounter a situation of initial disagreement or ignored the possibility of writing
messages.
24A ‘conversation’ between two officials may yield more than one statement since it may be split into
single entries.
25All examples are translated (word by word) into English from the original statements in German.
268.3 + 3.9%, Table 5
27 3.1+1.5
12.2 %, Table 5
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Table 5: Success and Content
Neutral Social Strategic Strategic Neg. Social/Strategic Total
Success 8.3% 0.8% 27.3% 1.5% 6.8% 44.7%
Failure 31.8% 3.1% 12.1% 6.8% 1.5% 55.3%
Total 40.1% 3.9% 39.4% 8.3% 8.3% 100%
Percentages are derived from 132 statements in TDT1 and TDT2
An explanation may be that in more than 75% of all situations a social argument was followed
(in the same chat conversation) by a statement arguing in favour of strategic reciprocity. 82%
of these situations ended with a successful corrupt transaction. The majority (56.0%28) of
statements contained arguments in favour of some kind of strategic reciprocity. Additional
to 63 statements of positive reciprocity there were 11 separate statements arguing in favour
of strategic defection aimed at extracting larger bribes in future periods. In 19 (out of all
28 or 22 relevant) groups of officials we found at least one statement in favour of strategic
reciprocity (positive or negative).
The dominance of arguments in favour of payoff maximization is demonstrated not only
by the relative frequency but also by the effectiveness as to corrupt success (71.5%29 of state-
ments including an argument for strategic (positive) reciprocity ended in a successful corrupt
transaction). This provides another piece of evidence for the hypothesis that the Profit Max-
imizing Motive is the driving force in the decisions made in groups. Arguments that seem
persuasive in the pursuit of payoff maximizing are adopted and corresponding suggestions
(i.e. maintenance of strategies aiming at payoff maximizing through corrupt reciprocity) re-
alized, while arguments in favour of social efficiency (and fairness) are neglected, since they
would lead to individually costly strategies. Again the argumentation is in line with the
Persuasive Argument Theory (Pruitt 1971).
We leave it to further research to separate the effect of the decision-making process from
effects stemming exclusively from the nature of the exchange of arguments via electronic
chat messages. For our purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of the 4EP the effort of
distinguishing between those two would lead to an even more artificial setting and therefore
would not help to derive conclusions.
2839.4 + 8.3 + 8.3%, Table 5
29 27.3+6.8
39.4+8.3%, Table 5
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6 Conclusion
The results of our experiment are interesting in two respects. First, they serve as an
assessment of the usefulness of the Four Eyes Principle. Second, they provide an insight into
the mechanism of group decision-making. With our experiment, using the framework of a
simple 3-Stage game which is standard in the experimental corruption literature, we show
that the introduction of the Four Eyes Principle, which is generally promoted as one of the
most effective tools to curb corruption, can be counter-productive. We find that it increases
the relative number of successful corrupt transactions as well as the amount of bribes being
transferred resulting in reduced welfare (measured by the sum of participants’ payoffs) and
equality (measured in the distribution of payoffs across participants).
Moreover, we find two opposing effects of the introduction of the Four Eyes Principle.
One, the Bribe Splitting Effect, is caused by the splitting of the transfer between two officials,
which reduces the level of corruption by changing the trade-off between its costs and its
benefits. The other, the Group Decision-making Effect, increases the level of corruption.
We are able to separate these two effects by the use of four different treatments and show
that the Group Decision-making Effect is negative and over-compensates the Bribe Splitting
Effect. This leaves a negative total effect due to the introduction of the Four Eyes Principle
with respect to the level of corruption and resulting social efficiency.
To explain the direction and magnitude of the Group Decision-making Effect (leading to
higher conditional rates of reciprocity) we proceeded in three steps. First, the differences in
revealed strategies between groups and individuals (i.e. final outcomes) can be identified by
non-parametric tests and quantified by (parametric) regression analyses of conditional levels
of corruption. Groups of officials reciprocate more often for high transfers and less often for
low transfers than individual officials. These functional strategies lead to a higher number of
successful corrupt transactions in the group decision-making treatments. Second, the analysis
of behaviour within the group decision-making process provides further evidence. Contrary
to predictions, in most cases initial disagreement between jointly deciding officials leads
to a successful corrupt transaction despite the veto-power of non-corrupt officials. Third,
we analyze the content of electronic chat-messages, exchanged during the decision-making
process. Arguments in favour of strategic reciprocity (i.e. initiating or maintaining only
corrupt transactions that yield a large payoff through high transfers) dominate the decision
making-process not only quantitatively but also in terms of effectiveness (outcomes). The
results of this 3-step analysis suggest the dominance of the ‘Profit Maximizing Motive’ in the
group decision-making process (Kocher and Sutter 2007). This is in line with the Persuasive
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Argument Theory (Pruitt 1971).
So, policies that prescribe group decision-making should be restricted to situations for
which the pursuit of maintaining reciprocal and payoff maximizing strategies are in line with
the policies’ objectives. Our results cast serious doubt on the usefulness of the Four Eyes
Principle for situations where this condition does not apply. Looking into the black box of
the mechanism that underlies group decision-making through the analysis of processes in
combination with content analyses within controlled laboratory experiments may help to
interpret behavioural patterns and to discover determinants of situations where the strategic
use of group decision-making might reduce social inefficiencies. Future research should be
directed at the theoretical foundation of the mechanisms found within group decision-making.
27
Appendix
Appendix A
Equilibrium in the 3-Stage Game
Proof by (backward Induction).
Denote by Ii,n the information set in stage i (i  {1, 2, 3}) of period n (n  {1, 2, ..., 10}).
Let p(Ii,n) be the probability of reaching the respective stage and q(‘s′|Ii,n) the conditional
probability of the relevant agent choosing action ‘s’ once reached Stage (i, n). An information
set contains all relevant information about ego’s and alter’s behaviour up to the respective
stage. Furthermore let PO(Ii,n) be the (sum of) payoff(s) gained up to the arrival of stage
(i, n).
First we show that there cannot be an equilibrium in which O chooses ‘cooperate’ in
Stage 3 of the last (10th) period. Consider a Strategy-Set EQU1 = [s1,1, s2,1, s3,1, s1,2..., s3,10]
in which the third stage of period 10 is reached with some probability (p(I3,10) > 0) and
O cooperates with some probability (q(‘cooperate’|I3,10) > 0). Compare the payoff, re-
sulting from the realization of Strategy-Set EQU1 (PO(EQU1)) to the one of an alterna-
tive Strategy-Set EQU1new which consists of the same strategies up to I3,10 but for which
q(‘cooperate’|I3,10) = 0 yielding payoff PO(EQU1new).
Since the payoff for period 10 is larger for EQU1new, since 8 + 3 ∗ b < 12 + 3 ∗ b,
EQU1 cannot constitute a Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Second we show that,
in the last (10th) period, B will never choose any Strategy-Set that includes the action
‘b > 0’ in Stage 1. Consider again a Strategy-Set EQU2 = [s1,1, s2,1, s3,1, s1,2, ..., s3,10] in
which p(I1,10) > 0, q(‘cooperate’|I3,10) = 0 and q(‘b > 0’|I1,10) > 0.30 Again compare
PO(EQU2) to PO(EQU2new), the payoff of a Strategy-Set that differs from the former
only in q(‘b > 0’|I1,10) = 0. Since 12 − b ≤ 12, payoff PO(EQU2) must be smaller than
PO(EQU2new) so that EQU2 cannot constitute an equilibrium. Hence only a Strategy-Set
featuring [s1,1, ..., s9,1, ‘b = 0’, ‘accept’/‘reject’, ‘defect’] can characterize an equilibrium.
Consider now a period-set PS = {k, ..., 10} of (the last 10-k) consecutive periods
for which the above stated last period’s equilibrium Strategy-Set is played. Assume
q(‘cooperate’|I3,k−1) > 0 for the period k − 1. By the same line of arguments as for the
last (10th) period we can easily repeat the task up to the point of excluding all strategy
30Given that q(‘cooperate’|I3,10) = 0 must be satisfied, O will never choose ‘reject’ in Stage 2 for ‘b > 0’
and is indifferent between ‘reject’ and ‘accept’ if ‘b = 0’, see Appendix 1C in Chapter 1.
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sets that do not exhibit the strategy characteristics of the (Stage Game) equilibrium in the
10th period [‘b = 0’, ‘accept’/‘reject’, ‘defect’]. Letting k decrease from 9 down to 1, it is
obvious that the Stage Game Nash Equilibrium remains the only Sub Game perfect Nash
Equilibrium in the (finitely) repeated game.
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Appendix B
Extensive forms of games in all treatments
In all treatments except TDT2 both, O and B, decide once in every period. In TDT2 only
B decides once per period while each O decides twice.
Figure 5: Extensive forms of TDT1 and IDT1
Figure 6: Extensive forms of TDT2 and IDT2
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Table 6: Model M1, Random effects estimation
Dependent variable: PP
Linear (OLS) Tobit
Coefficient Stand. error Coefficient Stand. error
Constant 22.2525∗∗∗ 1.02 22.1728∗∗∗ 1.92
b 1.8964∗∗∗ 0.28 1.8776∗∗∗ 0.35
b2 −0.2727 -0.29 −0.2734 -0.32
DIDT2 −0.1221 0.19 −0.1456 0.19
DTDT1 −6.3437∗∗∗ 0.84 −6.3332∗∗∗ 1.14
DTDT2 −3.0786∗∗∗ 0.46 −3.1232∗∗∗ 0.65
DIDT2*b 0.1321 0.17 0.1432 0.19
DTDT1*b 2.0542∗∗∗ 0.34 2.0318∗∗∗ 0.42
DTDT2*b 0.7415∗∗∗ 0.19 0.7332∗∗∗ 0.21
D2IDT2*b −0.0208 0.14 −0.0328 0.10
D2TDT1*b −0.2528 0.21 −0.2421 0.28
D2TDT2*b 0.4451 0.31 0.4721 0.52
overall R2 = 0.54 -
Number of periods: 10, Number of observation: 88, Number of
clusters: 64 (heteroskedasticity) robust standard errors in OLS
Table 7: Model M2
Dependent variable: Payoff
OLS Tobit
Coefficient Stand error Coefficient Stand error
Constant 225.2521∗∗∗ 54.92 224.5843∗∗∗ 44.47
N 15.8923∗∗∗ 2.48 15.5952∗∗∗ 3.11
DIDT2 −7.1245 10.29 −7.0319 8.39
DTDT1 −156.3421∗∗∗ 42.87 −157.2822∗∗∗ 44.27
DTDT2 −133.17∗∗∗ 39.72 −134.0318∗∗∗ 41.90
DIDT2*N −0.8177 1.17 −0.7849 1.06
DTDT1*N 3.1425∗∗∗ 0.73 3.1929∗∗∗ 0.75
DTDT2*N 5.0308∗∗∗ 0.95 5.1121∗∗∗ 0.78
adjusted R2 = 0.43 -
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level; Number of observations: 76;
Number of clusters: 64 (heteroskedasticity) robust standard errors
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Table 8: Model M4
Dependent variable: SC
transfer level
0 1 2 3 4 5
b 0.026∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
DIDT2*b −0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
DTDT1*b 0.018∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
DTDT2*b 0.015∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
SˆCIDT1 0.093 0.119 0.154 0.198 0.254 0.319
SˆCIDT2 0.092 0.116 0.147 0.192 0.241 0.303
SˆCTDT1 0.013 0.044 0.091 0.172 0.239 0.352
SˆCTDT2 0.009 0.034 0.073 0.146 0.195 0.318
transfer level
6 7 8 9 10 11
b 0.080∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
DIDT2*b −0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
DTDT1*b 0.057∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
DTDT2*b 0.047∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
SˆCIDT1 0.392 0.471 0.555 0.638 0.715 0.785
SˆCIDT2 0.370 0.445 0.523 0.598 0.672 0.737
SˆCTDT1 0.510 0.627 0.723 0.889 0.921 0.998
SˆCTDT2 0.471 0.542 0.698 0.802 0.897 0.967
Number of subjects: 96
Number of units: 64
*** denotes significance at the 1%-level
Marginal effects are calculated at the respective values of transfer and at the means
of the remaining independent variables
SˆC denotes the estimates for the success probabilities conditional on the respective
transfer levels.
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Appendix C: Instructions from TDT2 (translated from German)
Thank you very much for your appearance. In the next 90 minutes you will take part in an experiment
in the laboratory of MELESSA. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can (depending on your
decisions) earn money, additional to the show-up fee of 4 Euros. Additional to the money you can earn for
yourself, you will affect the amount of donation to the public aid organization ‘Doctors without Borders’.
The money you will earn during the experiment will be added to the show-up fee and paid out in cash at
the end of the experiment. The money that is going to be donated will be transferred to the donations
account of ‘Doctors without Borders’.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. If you have
questions, please approach one of the experimenters by raising your hand. In the case of violation of this
rule we have to exclude you from any payments.
During the experiment we will refer to Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) instead of Euros. Your income
will be calculated in EMU. In the end of the experiment the total amount will be exchanged in Euros.
The exchange rate is 1 EMU = 5 Eurocents.
All 24 participants are assigned to groups of four. Neither the experimenters nor the other participants
know which group you are in. Your decisions remain completely anonymous.
The Decision Situation
There are two types in this experiment: type A and type B. The types play different roles and make decisions
that affect their own income, the income of the other participants of the experiment and the amount of
donation transferred to the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’. The type of a participant is allocated
randomly.
A group of four consists of two type A and two type B participants who stay together for the entire
experiment.
The experiment has 10 periods.
Procedure:
All of the 10 periods consist of at most 3 Stages.
Stage 1
In the first Stage, every participant of type A (type A Nr 1 and type A Nr 2) decides on the size of
their transfer (T1 denotes type A Nr 1’s transfer and T2 denotes type A Nr 2’s transfer) which has to lie
between 0 and 12 EMU.
Next, the amount of the transfers is tripled and then split equally between the two type B participants
(type B Nr 1 and type B Nr 2) of the group of four. If T1 is for example 6 EMU, type B Nr 1 receives 9
EMU (0.5 ∗ 6 ∗ 3 EMU) and type B Nr 2 receives 9 EMU.
Hence there are 2 situations per group in any period:
Situation 1: Type A Nr1 transfers T1 to the two type B participants (where T1 is first tripled and then
shared)
Situation 2: Type A Nr2 transfers T2 to the two type B participants (where T2 is first tripled and then
shared)
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Stage 2
In Stage 2 the two type B participants decide jointly on how to react on the transfer of the respective type
A participant. They have (in both situations) two alternatives.
1st Alternative: Both decide (for a specific transfer, e.g. T1) jointly for ‘keep’: In this case Stage 3 is entered
2nd Alternative: One or both decide in favour of ‘distribute’: In this case, the respective type A participant
(e.g. type A Nr 1) does not get a bonus (and receives only 12 - T1 EMU). The type B participants both get
6 EMU plus half of the value of the transfer (6+ 0.5 ∗ T1 EMU). Moreover, the amount of 2 ∗ T1+ 24 EMU
is transferred as a donation to the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’.
A joint decision between the two subjects is found as follows.
First, each of the two type B participants decides individually whether to ‘keep’ or to ‘distribute’ the
particular transfer.
If the decision is not unanimous (one type B participant wants to ‘keep’ and the other wants to ‘distribute’
the transfer), the decision of the fellow participant appears on his or her own screen.
Next, the participants decide once again separately. If there is still no agreement, the two type B
participants can exchange messages via an electronic ‘chat’ (see explanation below) for one minute. After
this the participants decide for the last time.
Note that only if both type B participants decide in favour of ‘keep’ the third Stage is actually reached.
Since there are two type A participants in every group of four (type A Nr 1 and type A Nr 2), each of the
type B participants has to decide (jointly with the other type B participants) in two situations: once for T1
and once for T2.
Stage 3
In Stage 3 (which is only reached if both type B subjects have chosen ‘keep’) the two type B participants
decide again jointly whether to initiate a re-transfer or not.
Again, both type B subjects decide separately first.
If the decision is not unanimous (one type B participant wants to initiate the re-transfer and the other does
not), the decision of the other participant is shown on the screen. Then the participants can decide again
separately. If there is still no consent, the participants enter again a ‘chat’ in which they can exchange
electronic messages for one minute. After this, there is a final decision.
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1. Case: Both type B participants decide in favour of a re-transfer. Both carry the costs of 2 EMU
each (independent of the amount of the respective transfer). They both get 6 EMU plus one and a
half times the value of the transfer, less the costs of 2 (6 + 1.5 ∗ T1− 2 EMU). The respective type A
participant (type A Nr 1) receives a Bonus of 16 EMU in addition to the 12 EMU of initial endowment
(16 + 12− T1). In this case there is no donation to the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’.
2. Case: One or both type B participants decide against a re-transfer. In this case, there are no
personal costs for the two type B participants (they get 6 + 1.5 ∗ T1 each), the respective type A
participant does not receive a bonus (and gets 12 − T1), and the donation to the organization is 20
EMU.
In the end, all participants are shown their personal income in the period. Please note, that the type A
participants can thereby reconstruct whether or not the type B participants chose for or against the re-
transfer.
These (maximal) 3 stages are repeated 10 times (10 periods). Since the members of groups stay together,
participants always interact with the same persons in the same roles for the entire experiment. (Type
A Nr 1 remains type A Nr 1. type A Nr 2 remains type A Nr 2 etc.)
Chat:
Type B subjects potentially have the possibility to communicate via real time electronic messaging
(Chat) with their fellow type B subject to agree on a joint decision (e.g. ‘keep’ or ‘distribute’) in Stage 2
and Stage 3.
The content of the communication is generally free to choose but there are some restrictions. You are
not allowed to make statements about personal characteristics such as your name, age, address, gender,
subject of study or any information that might lead to your identification. Moreover, strong language is
strictly forbidden. Anyone who violates these rules of communication will be automatically expelled from
the experiment and will not get any payments for the entire experiment.
Each participant in the chat can send as many messages to the other participant as he wishes or is able to
send within the time limit of one minute.
Every message appears automatically on the screens of both type B participants of a group of four but
cannot be seen by any other participant of the experiment.
Payoff table
The following table shows the kind of consequences the decisions of the participants lead to - in terms of their
own payoff, the payoff of the other participants and the organization ‘Doctors without Borders’ (Example
for T1).
The following table can be read as follows. Generally we start from the top and go down cell by cell. If a
participant chooses a certain alternative, only those cells that lie directly beneath it are relevant for the next
period.
The payoff table is analogous for situations in which T2 (Transfer of Type A Nr2) is relevant.
Note that each type B participant receives two payments because two situations are relevant for each of
them, one with type A Nr 1 (T1 is relevant) and one with type A Nr 2 (T2 is relevant). These two are added
up for any period.
For the type A participants only one situation per period is relevant so that there is only one payment
per period.
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Each participant gets information at the end of each period about his own personal payoff. Type A subject
can infer whether type B subjects have chosen to initiate a re-transfer or not.
Note that the sum of payments (exchanged in Euros) to the organization is actually donated to ‘Doctors
without Borders’.
Timing
Stage 1: Type A Nr1 chooses T1 and Type A Nr2 chooses T2
Stage 2: Type B Nr1 and Type B Nr2 decide (T1 and T2) each time jointly about ‘keep’ or ‘distribute’
Stage 3:
Situation (for T1): Only reached if in this situation, both Type B participants chose ‘keep’ in Stage 2. In
this case, both Type B participants decide jointly whether to initiate a re-transfer or not.
Situation (for T2): is analogous, only for T2.
At the end of each of the ten periods, each participant gets information about his/her own payoff in the
respective period. At the end of the last (10th) period, participants get to know their final income and their
payment in Euros.
The following control questions will help you to get a better understanding of the situation. All the
necessary information can be found in the payment table.
Please answer all the control questions and raise your hand when you have finished. An experimenter will
come to your place to check your solutions.
Question 1
Assume that you are type A Nr1 and you chose a transfer of 4 EMU (T1). The other participant of
type A (type A Nr2) has chosen a transfer (T2) of 10 EMU.
Situation 1 (T1): One of the participants of type B in your group of four (type B Nr1) decides to ‘dis-
tribute’ your transfer (T1). The other participant of type B (type B Nr2) wants to ‘keep’ your transfer
(T1). (Therefore Stage 3 is not reached.)
Situation 2 (T2): Both type B participants chose to ‘keep’ the transfer of type B Nr 2 (T2) in Stage 2 and
decide against a re-transfer in Stage 3.
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a) What is the payoff of type B Nr1 in the situation (1) with type A Nr1 (you)?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the payoff of type B Nr2 in the situation (1) with type A Nr1 (you)?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is your (type A Nr1) total payoff in this period?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the total payoff of type B Nr1 for all situations relevant to him/her?
Your answer:________________________
e) What is the total payoff of type B Nr2 for all situations relevant to him/her?
Your answer:________________________
f) What is the total payoff of type B Nr2 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
g) What is the amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ caused by the situation relevant to you
(type A Nr1)?
Your answer:________________________
h) What is the amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ caused by the situation relevant to type A
Nr2?
Your answer:________________________
i) What is the total amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ in this period?
Your answer:________________________
j) What is the total amount of payoff generated by the decisions of your group of four?
Your answer:________________________
Question 2
Assume that you (type A Nr1) and type A Nr2 have both chosen a transfer of 0 (T1 is 0 EMU and T2 is 0
EMU). Neither participant of type B (neither type B Nr1 nor type B Nr2) wants to ‘keep’ any of the two
transfers in Stage 2.
a) What is your (type A Nr1) total payoff in this period?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the total payoff of type A Nr2 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is the total payoff of type B Nr1 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the total payoff of type B Nr2 for all situations relevant to him/her?
Your answer:________________________
e) What is the total amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ in this period?
Your answer:________________________
f) What is the total amount of payoff generated by the decisions of your group of four?
Your answer:________________________
Question 3
Assume that you (type A Nr1) have chosen a transfer of 5 EMU (T1 is 5 EMU) and type A Nr2 has also
chosen a transfer of 5 EMU (T2 is 5 EMU). Both participants of type B (type B Nr1 and type B Nr2)
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decide to ‘keep’ the transfer and initiate a re-transfer in Stage 3.
a) What is your (type A Nr1) total payoff in this period?
Your answer:________________________
b) What is the total payoff of type A Nr2 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
c) What is the total payoff of type B Nr1 in this period?
Your answer:________________________
d) What is the total payoff of type B Nr2 for all situations relevant to him/her?
Your answer:________________________
e) What is the total amount of donation to ‘Doctors without Borders’ in this period?
Your answer:________________________
f) What is the total amount of payoff generated by the decisions of your group of four?
Your answer:________________________
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